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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

21 June 1978

Mr. Raymond J. Brady  
Director, Division of Security  
Office of Administration  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Mr. Brady:

This responds to your request for advice as to whether DCID 1/7 markings may be used on foreign intelligence documents containing other than sources and methods information.

DCID 1/7 specifies controls on the dissemination and use of foreign intelligence for the purpose of ensuring adequate protection for sources and methods while also providing for the necessary exchange of information. The control markings specified by DCID 1/7 should thus only be used on documents whose information content is related to intelligence sources or methods in such a manner as to require more protection than can reasonably be expected from the use of security classifications and the application of the "need-to-know" principle alone. This does not require that such information content explicitly describe sources and methods. Section 5.a of DCID 1/7 gives examples of circumstances which would justify use of the restrictive markings involved.

Thus, an intelligence report may properly merit a DCID 1/7 restrictive marking because the information content could reasonably only have come from a narrow circle of sources, and the protection of that source requires that we restrict access to his information to avoid risking his compromise. Similarly, strict injunctions of confidentiality imposed on us by cooperating foreign or commercial sources as a condition of cooperation may require us to restrict the dissemination and use of information they provide.

In sum, the sensitive source or method considerations which justify use of DCID 1/7 markings may be construed broadly so long as they can be articulated.

  
Executive Secretary

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